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You can be the captain
I will draw the chart
Sailing into destiny
Closer to the heart
G. Lee, A. Lifeson, N. Peart Closer to the Heart
In the context of the much discussed exponential growth in knowledge it
should come as no surprise that the amount of paper spent on books, articles
and reports devoted to the calling of an intellectual and related struggles,
troubles as well as modest pleasures and rewards is also growing. I have not
studied and therefore cannot confirm if the growth in that segment of
knowledge production is exactly exponential, or does the function follow any
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other mathematical form. For the purposes of the current paper this bears no
particular importance. It would be fully sufficient if the parties agree that
quite a significant number of such writings have been recently brought to the
light of day and that there is no good reason to expect the production to
diminish in foreseeable future. Current regime of knowledge production
carries enough stimulating force to assure that each of the workers produces
one’s fair amount of text each day, not only getting it printed to avoid
perishing, but also patents as many of one’s ideas as possible (OLSEN,
2005).
What may sound trivial, though goes often unnoticed is the fact that
writings on intellectual life and calling are always autobiographical. People
who write those books and papers are without exception intellectuals. They
are so by the very definition. A rather significant corollary of the latter is that
despite what the authors of these reports may say or wish to present as
objectively true regarding the intellectual conditions of our or any other era,
or the contributions the intellectuals make or do not make, it should always
be taken with a grain of salt. So when John Searle for example declares that
the university constitutes «an aristocracy of trained intellect» (SEARLE,
1975: 88), this statement carries in a way a lot more and also much less than
a statement of an empirically established truth. The same applies to
individuals who talk about the age of supercomplexity - a concept that
ironically enough can impress but a relatively simple mind, or to those who
lament for the loss of something that has never existed, for example
Humboldtian research university (see e.g. Ash 1999). In each such case
does the author convey a message about himself, which the relatively
unlearned audience is expected to record for the sake of future generations. If
there is anything one can call la trahison des clercs almost eighty years
after Julien Benda wrote his jeremiad against the treason committed by the
intellectuals back in 1928 (BENDA,1958), this is the shameless self-
promotion looming large among the half-learned half-intellectuals, who no
longer have the patience to wait until the community of scholars recognizes
their contributions before they start crafting biographical sketches for
themselves, to witness to their status as world authorities in a field or
another. A paper or a book written, a talk or an interview given is expected to
create immediate reputation that translates directly into personal fortune
and fame, and funds raised for one’s ever so hungry university.
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More often than never such works do not only romanticize the
intellectual calling, but also present the relatively narrow interests of the
cognitive workers as coinciding with those of the society in general, calling
the latter for further sacrifices in the name of serving the higher values of
humanity. Obviously, these are the intellectuals who for the most of the
time know what is good for the humanity. There is, there can be no doubt
that what is good for the intellectuals and the organizational structure that
covers them, i.e. university, is good for everybody. Therefore one should be
somewhat cautious reading what the intellectuals say about themselves, as
such statements do not always come well-balanced. Critique of the criticizers
is often missing, or if it exists, it represents such a level of anti-
intellectualism that it cannot be taken seriously. Here lies the threat that
public in general remains always vulnerable to manipulations by its
intellectual elite and anybody who is in a position to criticize it by this very
fact has already joined the same interest group. Trying to expose the
ambiguity of the knowledge workers’ position in the knowledge society,
where their political interests could be taken, or even presented for the
knowledge produced, one should be aware of two other positions. The first of
them was presented in Vladimir Lenin’s letter to Maxim Gorky back in
1919:
«The intellectual forces of the workers and peasants are growing
stronger and getting stronger in their fight to overthrow the bourgeoisie
and their accomplices, the intellectuals the lackeys of capital, who consider
themselves the brains of the nation. In fact they are not its brains but its shit»
(LENIN, 1919/1997: 229).
While I am trying to argue that in a society where knowledge has become
one of the most important commodities the position of the knowledge
producers is gaining increasing sensitivity and possibly prone to
compromises, I am by no means suggesting, like Lenin and his followers in
the post-structuralist camp have been doing, that one should necessarily
become paranoid about tracing political interests in everything said and
written. What I am, however, saying is that political interest is often being
presented for empirical truth and with the growing trust of the public in
science, the boarder between the politics and science is being blurred, with
the political discourse being presented as scientific. As regards the latter, we
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should be more critical on what science can and cannot deliver and
acknowledge that the political discourse as such has the right to exist next to
scientific and philosophical discourses, each of them being called by its
own name. Underneath the declared progress of science a very different
thing may be happening. With the science becoming in the eyes of the
masses, to whom - to paraphrase Marx - it serves but as yet another kind of
opiate, the main legitimating force of politics, it is not that politics is being
effectively scientificized but the opposite -‘politics [is] co-opting the
language of science’ (HELLSTRÖM and JACOB, 2000).
Another position, which we should consider carefully, comes from an
Oxford philosopher William H. Newton-Smith. While for him a clear
difference between science and politics exists, he seems to allow surprisingly
broad range of acceptable behaviour to individuals in areas where intellectual
integrity does not serve the epistemic ends:
«One is just not supposed to tear out those pages of one’s laboratory
notebook that go against the hypothesis one has advanced in print. Clearly
this norm serves the epistemic ends in science. And it highlights a contrast
with other institutions such as politics and diplomacy. In the case of these
institutions the suppression of data is often seen as a positive virtue»
(NEWTON-SMITH, 2000: 345).
In my view, for an individual speaking from the position of an
intellectual, assuming such a fundamentally relativistic position with regard
to intellectual integrity of any professional activity would be impossible. If
we understand the intellectual as Shils (1969) does, clearly we have a
problem with such relativity:
«In every society however, there are some persons with an unusual
sensitivity to sacred, an uncommon reflectiveness about the nature of their
universe, and the rules which govern their society. There is in every society
a minority of persons who, more than ordinary run of their fellow-men,
are enquiring, and desirous of being in frequent communion with symbols
which are more general than the immediate concrete situations of everyday
life, and remote in their reference in both time and space. …. This interior
need to penetrate beyond the screen of immediate concrete experience
marks the existence of the intellectuals in every society» (SHILS, 1969: 25-
26).
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While an intellectual can establish and analyze ethical corruption in any
professional field, including diplomacy, it is hard to see how a person of
unusual sensitivity to sacred would find it possible to justify this. Within the
limits established here, the only possible consistent conclusion is that an
individual presenting such a position is morally corrupt. Such conclusion
would suggest that no everybody presenting him- or herself as an intellectual
at a closer look lives up to the standards of such calling, meaning that not
every scribe and teaching assistant, or even professor, necessarily qualifies as
an intellectual. While Edward Said draws a line based on a similar argument
between amateur intellectuals and professionals:
«For example, the difference I drew earlier between a professional and
an amateur intellectual rests precisely on this, that the professional claims
detachment on the basis of a profession and pretends to objectivity, whereas
the amateur is moved neither by rewards nor by fulfilment of an immediate
career plan but by a committed engagement with ideas and values in the
public sphere» (SAID, 1996: 109);
in my view it is also fully obvious that under the current regime of mass
production of knowledge, producing knowledge has become an assembly
line work as an opposite to the earlier performing of an aristocratic calling.
I. INTELLECTUALS AND KNOWLEDGE WORKERS
There is every good reason to raise such an argument. It would be
actually hard to assume how the mass university and research and
development sector could be filled with exceptional individuals of unusual
sensitivity to sacred. Whichever the personality characteristics and
dispositions these individuals carry may be, they should be rather usual if for
no other reason than because of the sheer size of the sectors. Most of the
individuals involved in mass education and research are by definition not
unusual but usual. They are involved in routine work under routine
conditions and should for all good reasons be considered as knowledge
workers, representatives of a mass production profession. It would be entirely
futile to try to describe these individuals as exceptional for their moral
qualities and there is certainly no reason to romanticize their jobs more than
any other (TOMUSK, 2003).
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The fate of the intellectuals, particularly during the second half of the
twentieth century is tragic. First, the rapidly expanding universities absorbed
most of the intellectually inclined, and then transformed them into workers in
the knowledge-production industry, thus actually decimating the class of
independent intellectuals (JACOBY, 1987/2000). Many of the cognitive
activities carried on in higher education and research sectors no longer
qualify as genuinely intellectual. A science aristocrat engaging in routine
laboratory experimenting would certainly not qualify, as would a philosophy
professor from whom Anthony Blair, the Prime Minister of the kingdom no
longer as great and as united as it once used to be, seems to have taken his
lessons arguing for the war in Iraq before the British parliament. On the other
hand, a samizdat author in the Soviet Union, to whom only the lowest level
of manual employment was available, would qualify as one, perhaps the
only type of intellectual under the Soviet regime. For us, moving and
regulating knowledge like money, as Bernstein (1996) suggests, is of no
particular intellectual value. Indeed, when Bernstein argues that under the
current regime of truly secular concept of knowledge is money and divorced
from people, their commitments and their personal dedication (BERNSTEIN,
2000: 86); the knowledge of an intellectual is necessarily related to people,
their commitments and their personal dedications.
One may suggest that being an intellectual is more than a job, a function
an individual performs for a certain number of hours each week for pre-
determined remuneration; being an intellectual means playing a role in the
Theatrum Mundi:
«The character, a person in the theatre of the world, is totally involved in
his role. He relies on his intimate intuitions and feelings much more than he
would in fulfilling a function. He counts neither his time nor his effort. He
mobilises all his faculties. The function brings to mind a kind of work that
produces a reliable result, is measurable and verifiable. But the role suggests
a vigilant presence, aiming for an end described in terms of well-being or
happiness, which is to say that it cannot be measured» (DELSOL 2003: 141-
142; my italics V.T.).
It should come as of little surprise that, as the economy has become war
by other means, to paraphrase von Clausewitz, everyone is expected to
become a foot-soldier in the global economic war, with university acting as
MONOGRÁFICO El Proceso de Bolonia. Dinámicas y desafíos de la enseñanza...
150 Revista Española de Educación Comparada, 12 (2006), 145-169
the military academy. Delsol offers a sobering explanation on how the global
economic regime transforms societies into massive armies:
«Functions require interchangeable actors with equal levels of required
competency. A typical example is the army, in which by definition the
players must be instantly replaceable; they must therefore become
indistinguishable from their functions, whence the anonymity of uniforms
and the use of rank for identification. In similar but less obvious ways a
hospital requires a radiologist, a university requires a medieval specialist,
and a business needs a sales manager» (ibid, p. 142).
In such a world we no longer ask ’What is true?’ and ‘What is good?’ but
instead ‘How can we live better?’ or ‘How to stay alive?’. Obviously, ‘living
better’ may mean different things to different people, and having broad-
band access to the Internet is not exactly what the world’s most needy people
dream of, although we view it as a universal blessing on the assumption that
what makes Mr. Gates richer should be good for everybody.
Another force corroding the institution of the intellect is the expected
immediate practicality and applicability of its outcomes. Here, the
achievement record of social research appears rather disappointing.
Immanuel Wallerstein laments loudly:
«The fact is that, after 150 years of an amazing amount of work, world
social science has much too little to show for itself and is unable to perform
the social task that outsiders demand of it - providing wise counsel about
how to solve what are considered to be the ‘problems’ of the present»
(WALLERSTEIN 2004: 176).
He is perhaps right in arguing that the lists of social problems social
scientists have solved over the past century and a half remain unimpressive.
But again, returning to Shils’ definition, we should first acknowledge that
societies need certain number of intellectuals even if they do not produce any
solution to any problems, but only apply their intellectual faculties endlessly
complaining about everything all the time, suffering themselves most because
of the imperfectability of our miserable human condition. Lepenies explains:
«We saw that labour was a means of counteracting the bourgeois
melancholy that developed after the economic emancipation of the
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bourgeoisie. It permitted the space of introversion to be left to those who
could not or would not become economically active, namely the free-floating
intelligentsia» (LEPENIES, 1992:180).
Following from this, forcing intellectuals to become economically
productive would actually be a rather perverse thing to do. It would violate
their fundamental identity of being unproductive by definition. If cornered,
intellectuals, as Lepenies also indicates, would be able to produce something,
though one cannot be sure if this is exactly what we need:
«Utopia emerges from melancholy with the world and from the world’s
inadequacy and ends with the impossibility of reflection, the prohibition of
melancholy, and the redeeming promise of a stable happiness within a
manageable space» (LEPENIES, 1992, p. 148).
Prophet Jeremiah, one of the first recorded intellectuals, summarizes
the essence of his calling not worse than any of the twentieth century
sociologists:
«From early times the prophets who preceded you and me have
prophesied war, disaster and plague against many countries and great
kingdoms. But the prophet who prophesies peace will only be recognized as
one truly sent by the Lord if his prediction comes trae» (JER. 28:8-9).
With the expansion of higher education and social research in particular,
availability of funding forces formerly critical social scientists to policy
research and development. The outcomes of that, as Michael Young
(YOUNG, 2004) demonstrates in the case of South African educational
policy, do not look promising either. The uncompromising position of the
intellectual is good neither for policy development nor politics. Engaging in
those areas puts the integrity of intellectuals at risk. Policies are always to be
negotiated on the political grounds; however, truth politically negotiated
cannot be seen as truth by anybody but most ardent Marxists-Leninists and a
handful of post-modern theoreticians. Not to add that one sees an academic
negotiating his theory before the university senate. While in his time, Karl
Mannheim, perhaps mistakenly so, thought it possible to combine intellectual
responsibilities, science and politics (see e.g. Mannheim 1936/1968), on
this point I would rather agree with Barzun (1959/2002) who, while arguing
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for the intellectual freedom of intellectuals, also understands that the house of
intellect has its limits, both regarding the tasks it can undertake without
compromising its identity, as well as its sheer size. An intellectual is, after all,
a dangerous creature:«The servant of truth seems always ready to kill: the
mild scholar lives to destroy his colleague with a theory, and this fratricide is
his duty and title to fame» (BARZUN, 1959/2002: 176).
Not a good disposition for writing, let us say, a policy paper. While
explaining how eccentric intellectuals lured into the contemporary university
fail as intellectuals, as well as cognitive workers, Wallerstein also argues that
the social sciences lack the tools, and above all the language that would
allow them to deliver the promise of resolving problems. The problems
identified and the language used to resolve them originate from the same
liberal worldview, meaning that the solutions are in the language of the
problems. That may well mean that no amount of additional research would
break the verbal circle. As already mentioned above, the very language of
such problem-solving is irrelevant to the life experience of those who have
not been endowed with university-produced knowledge. This unfortunately
shows at least the social scientists in the contemporary university in a
somewhat unfavourable light: as problem-solvers they face the threat of
being irrelevant, as intellectuals - corrupt.
Those who demand hard social relevance from social sciences may
follow a fundamentally wrong path. Theory is always detached from the
practice on both sides - for its development based on empirical evidence
derived from the practical experience as well as for its impact on human
action. As for the former, philosophers well know that a number of extra-
empirical principles of selecting and organizing the data enter every theory.
As for the latter, we also know that human beings are not particularly good at
acting according to their own preferred theories or consistent following their
philosophical and moral convictions. The only way out I am able to see
would be to argue that critical and theoretical social reflection has its rightful
place among all other types of human activity independently of its immediate
practicality, which, however, does not necessarily mean that the sector, being
lead by false expectations, has not grown excessively large over the past half
a century.
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II. HIGHER EDUCATION RESEARCH
Higher education research would make an interesting, although not
entirely uncontroversial example demonstrating the predicament in
contemporary social science. While being perhaps not entirely conclusive,
looking at our own colleagues’ toiling on the boarder of melancholy and
power, knowledge and propaganda would perhaps shed some light on the
intellectual commitment and practical value of the works in our own camp of
labour. Teichler’s recent paper (TEICHLER, 2003) echoes some of the issues
rose by Wallerstein and indicates the relevance of his arguments in the
context of higher education research. According to Teichler, higher education
research has been a growing field over recent decades, and those involved in
it act concurrently as consultants, institutional researchers and administrators
(ibid, p. 178). It is not, however, entirely obvious what the latter precisely
means. Could it be about the growing attractiveness of higher education
researchers for many jobs in the city of intellect or the knowledge factory,
including the administrative responsibilities instead of, as it was until
recently, simply occupying academic positions in sociology, political science
and economics departments, as Teichler seems to be assuming; or do we
actually see a reverse causal connection—representatives of a growing
number of previously non-academic professional categories claiming
academic status, if not a robe of an intellectual, in an attempt to elevate
their professional standing by developing publication records and lists of
conference talks for their Curriculum Vitae? This, as we well know, is often
the case with provosts of the College-on-the-Hill (DeLillo 1984) and alike
presenting their old war stories, or a deputy Minister of Education of a
semi-autocratic, half-failed post-communist state presenting the daydreams
of his Minister for the latest innovations in the field. In days when the
available page-space in quasi-academic journals significantly exceeds the
offer of papers meeting acceptable quality standards, there is a significant
chance for such a production to reincarnate on the pages of journals, which I
would rather not name here. Be that as it may, the result is not exactly
satisfying:
«Most analyses emerging are so strongly shaped by the high
expectations that they are somewhat blind to the possible ‘mixed
performance’ which tends to show up in the implementation process of
reforms» (TEICHLER, 2003: 178).
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By using unusual adjectives as somewhat blind, Professor Teichler seems
to be suggesting, albeit politely, that learned colleagues have often failed to
acknowledge that their research has drifted away from the reality, being no
longer, if it ever was, in a position to inform the reforms of once-again
mixed or no outcomes. As Wallerstein (2004) argues, this failure has deep
epistemological roots. The conceptual apparatus applied has a high
expectation built into it, so that failure becomes inexpressible. One could also
make an argument for newly born administrator-researchers being neither
fully competent researchers nor fully responsible intellectuals. Finally, it
cannot be ruled out that manufacturing high expectations is the very goal of
much of social science research, a direct expression of the interests of the
scientists themselves as well as those of the paymasters. Systematically
cultivated high expectations keep the funding streams alive and politicians
whose programs receive scientific legitimisation satisfied. Unfortunately,
such research fails to see beyond itself being merely, as Teichler suggests,
l’art pour l’art. Perhaps not the aesthetically most satisfying art one could
possibly find.
One recent, rather high-calibre attempt that could be seen in terms of
pushing public expectations for the practical outcomes of science to its very
limits is the discussion on the so-called Mode1-Mode2 transition (GIBBONS
et al., 1994). On the opposite side, Fuller (2000) refuses to accept that
drawing such a distinction as Gibbons and colleagues argue for is historically
justified, suggesting instead that the two modes have both been there
challenging and enforcing each other for as along as long as man has been
consciously reflecting on his environment. While disciplines obviously
change, expectations for the Mode 1 to disappear are as little justified as the
arguments that Mode 2 represents any particular historical novelty. Kivinen
and Ahola give a relevant hint on the source of the multiple identity of
higher education researchers and their interests, the functionaries of various
breeds who have been able to obtain, amongst other things, the researcher’s
hat using science to create comfortable niches in the chain of knowledge
production: «High-powered executive and political experts—often backed up
by statutory privileges—create needs which they alone have the authority to
fulfil» (KIVINEN, AHOLA, 1999).
A multiple identity as described by Teichler allows generating a need for
certain kinds of knowledge, supposedly applied and closely policy-relevant.
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Whatever the benefits of such knowledge may be, it cannot be ignored that
this is the knowledge the above-mentioned functionaries are in a position to
produce, in contrast, for example, with theoretical and conceptual work that
would require more solid preparation, or critical discourses that might not
necessarily yield cash flow. Policy research to manufacture a discourse of
permanent progress is, however, a safe genre both in social sciences in
general, as well as in higher education research. Still, as Wallerstein (2004)
argues, in its functions of interpreting and affecting social reality social
science is an arena of social struggle. In a knowledge society this struggle
may be easily merged with other struggles, for example with the one waged
by those occupying increasingly insecure positions between the science
aristocracy and knowledge workers (TOMUSK, 2003). There is no strictly
value-free research; the question concerns the nature of particular values at
play. In the contemporary university it is often survival that is at stake, and its
value cannot be underestimated.
III. PRODUCTION OF BOLOGNA KNOWLEDGE
Public man who once walked the streets of the great European cities of
London and Paris in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as Sennett
(1977) describes him has little to do with today’s knowledge manager. In his
stead we see a freshish holder of a Master of Business Administration degree
wearing an office suit. Instead of culture, MBA stands for its antithesis. It
reminds us that the ultimate truth of the society we inhabit—the
dissemination of which is being perceived as a sign of irreversible progress,
and not only in the offices of the European Commission and the International
Monetary Fund—is that Greed is good. Without greed there is no growth, no
progress. Without growth, that is, as Gellner told us, without greed there is
even no democracy (GELLNER, 1994).
The reduction of the great theatrum mundi to the battlefield of global
economic competition leaves little space for intellectuals, parasites on a
society who are in such pain thinking about other things, that they do not
have the slightest intention of becoming economically productive. Mass
mobilisation in the global economic war requires everybody to become a
soldier on both fronts—production as well as consumption. Higher education
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has become one of the expensive services every good citizen is expected to
consume to keep the economy growing, even if the dreams of gaining up-
ward social mobility through higher education degrees are being frustrated at
an accelerating speed. Life-long learning, so much spoken about recently
merely institutionalises the obligation to consume formalized education.
Neave perceives this shift in higher education in the following terms:
«This is the transition of higher education from being considered as a
sub-set of the political system—the selection of, formation and enculturation
of elites—to its redefinition as a sub-set of the economic system—the
training of the mass for the private sector labour market» (NEAVE, 2004a).
At this point we have perhaps little agreement on the broader meaning of
the Bologna Process. As the reports from different countries indicate
(TOMUSK, 2006) expectations are widely diverse, ranging from tapping into
resources of richer countries, to securing political favour before Brussels’
decision makers and remaining in tune with the processes that would
eventually lead to a European system of higher education for those who
fall within the boarders of the Community. Although not everybody agrees to
that, I would still argue that despite its formal set-up, the Bologna Process is
primarily a higher education reform program of the European Union that
should not be seen originating from signing the Bologna Joint Declaration in
1999, but adopting the Commission’s «Memorandum on Higher Education in
the European Community» back in 1991 (COMMISSION, 1991). The
existence of this, unfortunately often ignored document in the context of the
Bologna Process also explains the Commission’s high interest in it. I would
also argue, as I have done elsewhere (TOMUSK, 2004b) that the
Commission’s primary agenda in the Process is economic. It is through re-
designing the European higher education products to increase their
competitiveness and success on the world market, particularly in competition
against the universities of the United States. All other items included among
the goals of the Bologna Process remain secondary, at least for the
Commission, who, do we like it or not, has occupied the driver’s seat.
This perspective certainly explains the Commission’s frustration over
endless discussions over the idea of the university, instead of solving the
technical questions related to its goals (OLSEN, 2005). This creates a degree
of resistance in the academic community:
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«The Commission was attacked for vulgarizing the debate. It presented
higher education solely as an instrument of economic policy and gave a too
narrow interpretation of the university’s basic misión» (ibid. p. 23).
The Commission, from its position: «sees itself as surrounded by
ignorance and lack of commitment» (ibid. p. 22).
To secure achieving its global goals, the Commission uses all available
means from political intimidation, to grant-making and buying-off the
knowledge workers. Perhaps the informed reader remembers the historical
statement by the former commissioner Reding:
Bologna cannot be implemented a la carte, it has to be done across the
board and wholeheartedly. If not, the process will leave European higher
education even less strong and united than before (REDING, 2003).
On the wake of that one can notice official and less so Bologna-speakers
travelling around the continent and repeating this statement, paying little
attention to its relevance or applicability, for example in countries like the
Russian Federation (TOMUSK, 2006).
One would perhaps agree that the Commission, which does not have a
particularly high level of competence in higher education, and therefore
drives the sector strongly towards its vocationalization (see e.g. Olsen 2005)
vulgarizes the discussions and de-intellectualizes not only the Process, but
also threatens the future of European higher education. In this, it would
need a cooperation of knowledge workers in the field of higher education
studies. Exploring the role of such pseudo-intellectuals amplifying and
spreading the Commission’s official discourse offers some insights to broader
intellectual conditions of our age.
There is no necessity for the project of creating the European Higher
Education Area to take a radically anti-intellectual shape, as it currently
seems to be doing. One may even suggest that spending a few units of the
common currency, generously made available by the European nations
might, if wisely spent, allow some people with an unusual sensitivity to the
sacred and an uncommon reflectiveness, as Shils (1969) suggested, to engage
significant intellectual tasks which otherwise could not be pursued. Though
it may well be the case that as it was in 18th century Cambridge where
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supporting writing letters was not in the interests of too many of the
benefactors and scholars died in the debtor’s prison (ARBERRY, 1960/1997),
generating propaganda is perceived as a more honourable task among those
controlling the purse in Brussels.
Turning now to the rapidly growing body of Bologna literature, one
may notice that the borders between the genres are increasingly blurred.
Among this literature we find first the relatively uncontroversial political
declarations: Magna Charta Universitatum (CRE, 1988), the Sorbonne
Declaration (DECLARATION, 1998) and the Bologna Declaration
(DECLARATION, 1999). On that fundament lies a second layer of political
documents, primarily the communiqués of bi-annual ministerial meetings.
Beyond that blurring begins: Declarations of the European University
Association’s conventions constitute the first level of an attempt to reconcile
what Neave (2002) calls the «pays politique» and the «pays réal», that is, the
political discourse and institutional realities of European higher education,
the former perhaps not fully appreciating the inevitable imperfection of the
latter. The Trend reports, officially called «Trends in Learning Structures in
European Higher Education», three of which have appeared (see e.g.
REICHERT, TAUCH 2003) with a fourth under way at the time of writing
this paper, represent, at least formally, a move in a different direction, an
attempt to inform the political process from the actual state of affairs in
European universities as related to various issues of implementation of the
Bologna Process. On the top of all of that cognitive production stand the
works of the academics that by claiming the status of intellectuals represent
the ambition of presenting the naked truth in its entire Apollonian beauty.
Contrary to their, one may assume, entirely sincere intentions, His Majesty
has been dressed in the most eclectic mix styles even an Italian fashion
designer could possibly imagine.
This production carries all the signs of compromise I discussed in relation
to higher education research earlier in this paper. It often presents political
declarations in the place of descriptions of the actual state of affairs and
boosts high expectations while ignoring the inevitably mixed nature of the
outcomes. Earlier the many roles academic higher education researchers
may undertake in contemporary society were discussed. Among the recent
Bologna literature we find a progress report (ZGAGA 2003) compiled by
somebody who has burdened his earthly existence with a rather widely
Melancholy and Power, Knowledge and Propaganda... Voldemar Tomusk
Revista Española de Educación Comparada, 12 (2006), 145-169 159
spread mix of two incompatible roles: those of an academic and a politician.
The report, which is combines of political declarations with attempts at
objective analysis, in itself indicates the apparent cognitive dissonance
caused by Destiny’s evil experiment to lock in a single skull the minds of
both a Professor of Educational Studies and a Minister of Education.
Zgaga (ibid.) has apparently no difficulty in first declaring that «Nobody
pushes them [the signatory countries] to that direction administratively; it is
more and more the national need and national priority», and then a few
pages later precisely the opposite—push: «the Bologna Process was not a
mere voluntary action any more for the EU Member States and not for the
candidate Member States either», this already in full unison with the former
Commissioner Reding in whose professional vocabulary the word voluntary
seems to have been entirely missing (see e.g. TOMUSK, 2004b). Somebody
obviously has to be out there making the Bologna Process a need and priority
for the European nations. Since, however, even the European Union cannot
make the Bologna Process compulsory for its member states, as action in
higher education remains the prerogative of the member states, it is doing it
under the heading of «strengthening European co-operation» (ZGAGA,
2003). With the big stick comes the carrot—the much anticipated market
success of new European higher education:
«‘Bologna’ has become a new European higher education brand, today
easily recognised in governmental policies, academic activities, international
organisations, networks and media» (ibid.).
Reading the mentioned report and other similar papers encourages one to
join Neave (2004) in his question:
«Can it be that the architects of Bologna truly believe that in default of
academia, the academic interest can be represented vicariously by a motley
and Ersatz conglomerate of experts, consultants many of whom have ‘taken
the Queen’s shilling’?»
While there are theories other than moral corruption available to explain
the views expressed in the Zgaga Report and similar documents - one may
for example think of consciously misrepresenting the reality to unenlightened
masses for the sake of their own good - the situation is somewhat different
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looking at writings on ‘Bologna’ by academics functioning as academics.
That leads us to another of Neave’s observations, that: «In the absence of
counter comments, even the most scholarly and balanced piece of research
finds great difficulty in distancing itself from propaganda» (ibid.).
The way Neave expresses his position is similar that of Teichler quoted
earlier in this paper, to the effect that some researchers are oftentimes
somewhat blind to certain aspects of certain issues. A recent article by
Huisman and Wende that appeared in a learned journal (Huisman, Wende
2004) as a result of an EU funded project suggests that the reason for
academics presenting propaganda as research outcomes lie neither in a
limited visual impairment nor an absence of critical comments, but may be
rather directly induced by the Queen’s shilling.
Huisman and Wende have come up with an analysis which appears
sanguine even in the context of the most politically motivated official
Bologna knowledge. One may think that last time in history similar
enthusiasm was expressed by the academics was when comrade Stalin
received reports from his secular priesthood (for Chomsky’s
misunderstanding of Berlin’s concept ‘secular priesthood’ see Berlin 1978
and Chomsky 2002) regarding the success and enthusiasm of peasants
joining the kolkhozes during the Soviet Union’s forced collectivisation.
Without hesitation the authors declare that:
«In less than ten years, harmonisation (preferably labelled as
‘convergence’) of higher education structures changed from an undesirable
objective to a highly advisable aim» (HUISMAN, WENDE, 2004).
It remains, though, open who exactly the advisers are. It is only a part of
the problem that the approach Huisman and Wende have taken focuses
entirely on those signatory countries of the Bologna Declaration that belong
to the European Union, skipping the issue of harmonising European higher
education with that of the Russian Federation—1,300 chronically under-
funded and mismanaged universities enrolling close to six million students,
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan and so on and so forth. They also ignore a
widely known fact that so far the Bologna Process has been primarily
political in nature and that the capacity of the universities to absorb any of
the envisioned reforms remains yet to be tested (see e.g. Reichert and Tauch
2003, Neave 2004).
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One should obviously not push too far the comparison between the
European Union as a federal super-state in the making and the Soviet Union
as a federal super-state gone by, although certain similarities, starting with a
top-heavy bureaucracy are too visible to ignore. As are the intentions of the
enthusiasts of both the constructions. As in the days of yore, Huisman and
Wende appreciate the enthusiasm of the European nation states embracing
the Union’s intervention in an area for which it does not even have a
mandate—higher education (see e.g. Tomusk 2004b)—and is therefore,
strictly speaking, illegal:«We have maintained that the presumed lack of
national governments’ acceptance of inter- or supranational interference is
not as profound as expected» (HUISMAN, WENDE, 2004).
The following sentence from the same paper will perhaps for some time
tower over the Bologna writings, reflecting a particular state of mind in all of
its richness and with all its subtleties:
«Fuelled both by the general expectations of the European Commission
pleading a European dimension in higher education, but maybe even more
by the education policy reviews of OECD, national governments to a
considerable extent realised (albeit subjectively) whether their national
higher education system was still sufficiently in line with a certain
(European) model, even though such an ideal model might never be
attainable or might even not be existent in practice (but the idea may be very
persistent in the minds of policy-makers and certainly in the minds of those
responsible for the reviews)».
Asking for the meaning of a national government’s subjective realisation
would be certainly perceived as a malicious act. It is obvious that the phrase
is devoid of meaning if analyzed from the point of view of political science
or educational policy. H.G. Wells, back in 1935, wrote exactly about using
such phrases, seeing nations, or for this matter, governments, as personalities:
«That sort of thing seems to me a romantic simplification of what is really
happening in human affairs, and I think it leads to disastrous results»
(WELLS, 1935).
There is no doubt that by instigating the production of such texts and
reports, which fail to draw a line between political propaganda and
intellectual analysis or have been written with the simple aim of pleasing the
funding agency, the Bologna Process is not only corrupting the intellectual
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sphere in the narrow meaning of the term, but is also eroding the integrity of
the scholarship within universities, as well as beyond them.
IV. CONCLUSION
It has, after all, perhaps been a mistake to try understanding the modern-
time academics as intellectuals. While one can possibly agree that a
significant part of the academia does not yet fall for its intellectual abilities
and ethical standards below the society’s average and that their daily work is
still of cognitive nature, that falls far short of the expectations historically laid
before the intellectual calling. Expansion of the university, economic stress,
mass production of graduates as well as knowledge products has eroded
the intellectual integrity of the life of mind and forced the melancholic to an
impossible situation, producing utopian plans:
«Utopia emerges from melancholy with the world and from the world’s
inadequacy and ends with the impossibility of reflection, the prohibition of
melancholy, and the redeeming promise of a stable happiness within a
manageable space» (LEPENIES, 1992: 148).
Utopian visions are very much present in the academic discourse of
many disciplines, starting from science and technology, biology and other
fields, perhaps in a counter-proportional measure to the amount of time
individuals representing those fields having spent studying philosophy
(TOMUSK, 2004a). In the world of global economic competition
melancholy is not exactly encouraged. As some of the reports on the mood in
the European Commission indicate, there is still far too much of
unproductive contemplation going on in European higher education, and
too little action to move Europe to a glorious victory. Surely, the melancholy
man does not make a great warrior.
The second mistake would be to try understanding people engaging in
higher education studies as academics, even if no longer perfect in their
melancholic attitude to the world. Coming from divers backgrounds these
individuals are often trying to convert their life experience into academic
capital - papers, talks and books that lead to further access to academic
tourism and elevation of the status in the community which does not
Melancholy and Power, Knowledge and Propaganda... Voldemar Tomusk
Revista Española de Educación Comparada, 12 (2006), 145-169 163
necessarily have too much of a respect to administrators and bureaucrats of
various brands now better known by the euphemism ‘policy makers’.
Therefore there seems to be an obvious pressure pushing individuals from the
margins of the academic community - interdisciplinary researcher of the
life in that community - towards the fount of further prestige and power - the
great manufacture of Bologna knowledge. Opportunities abound - from
national Bologna speakers to unit level course modulizers, job profilers and
credit hour accountants. Political support and legitimacy are guaranteed not
by means of recognition in the academic community, but by means of the
power extended from government offices and carried by the name of the
great Process itself, which, one my guess, academics in the traditional fields
do not pay too much of attention to (see e.g. Välimaa et al. 2006).
I have no intention to argue that the intellectual corruption currently
spreading among the Bologna reporters, promoters and workers is general to
the entire academic community. Though it may indicate a direction social
sciences are moving under the pressure of what I believe is a somewhat
inadequate request to produce applied and policy-relevant knowledge. Under
the pressure of such demands academia is losing its autonomy. Perhaps,
disciplines that have developed a stronger body of canonical knowledge
and have established stronger institutional controls, trading integrity for a
grants or a power positions is more difficult than in a research field which is
applied and interdisciplinary by virtue of its very definition. But again,
massification of knowledge has lead to breaking the social science discourse
into hundreds of small enclaves where quasi-academic entrepreneurs, if I
may use the words of a Princeton philosopher Harry G. Frankfurt
(FRANKFURT, 2005), produce ‘bullshit’, printing it in each other’s learned,
or not so much, journals. For the time being, even such knowledge still
succeeds legitimating politics. One may though wonder for how long that
may possibly last.
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RESUMEN
Una reforma sin precedentes en la educación superior europea, conocida
como el proceso de Bolonia, con el objetivo de aumentar la competitividad
internacional de los proyectos educativos y la propia educación europea,
ha ofrecido grandes oportunidades a los investigadores para trabajar sobre la
creación del conocimiento y su diseminación. El autor de este artículo
demuestra cómo la agenda política fijada por los patrocinadores del Proceso,
interactúa con los mecanismos de producción del conocimiento en aquellos
campos que carecen de un fuerte apoyo institucional, llevando a un discurso
donde el conocimiento objetivo y las declaraciones políticas están siendo
presentadas conjuntamente como conocimiento científico. El autor
argumenta que, mientras la educación superior _subordinada a los objetivos
del proceso de Bolonia_ representa un caso extremo de compromiso
intelectual, otros campos de las ciencias sociales son propensos a
experimentar violaciones similares. Esto conduce al autor a concluir que un
número significante del personal docente de las universidades, ha cesado de
actuar como intelectuales y, en su lugar, le ha sido designado el papel de
trabajadores del conocimiento, operando dentro del diferente marco de los
requisitos profesionales y estándares éticos. Mientras que a corto plazo
pueda parecer beneficioso a aquellos políticos y oficiales preocupados en
movilizar todos los recursos posibles para lograr los objetivos marcados, a
largo plazo la erosión de la función crítica de los intelectuales puede exponer
tanto a los programas relacionados como a la sociedad, a una serie de riesgos
normalmente vinculados con regímenes totalitarios.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Conocimiento. Poder. Producción del
conocimiento. El Proceso de Bolonia. Las funciones de los intelectuales.
Estándares éticos. Utopía.
ABSTRACT
An unprecedented reform in European higher education known as the
Bologna Process with its ultimate aim to boost international competitiveness
of European knowledge products and higher education services has created
ample opportunities for higher education researchers to engage in related
knowledge production and dissemination. The author of this article
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demonstrates how the political agenda set by the sponsors of the Process
interacts with the process of knowledge production in the field that lacks
strong institutional roots, leading to a discourse where objective knowledge
and political declarations are being mixed and presented together as scientific
knowledge. While, the author argues, higher education research subordinated
to the goals of the Bologna Process represents an extreme case of intellectual
compromise, other fields of social sciences are prone to similar violations.
This leads the author to conclude that a significant element of the academic
staff in mass universities no longer act as intellectuals. Instead, they have
been designated the role of knowledge workers who operate within a
different framework of professional requirements and ethical standards.
While this may in short run appear beneficial to politicians and officials
concerned about mobilizing all available resources to achieve their short-term
goals, in a long term, erosion of the critical function of the intellectuals
may expose the related programs as well as the societies at large to risks
usually related to totalitarian regimes.
KEY WORDS: Knowledge. Power. Knowledge Production. Bologna
Process. Intellectuals’ Functions. Ethical Standards. Utopia.
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